yandex.com
Live email deliverability and anti-spoofing audit. Every value below was read from public DNS at the moment this page was generated.
73/100 — Workable, but mail from this domain is more likely to land in spam than it needs to be. Accepts mail · Spoofable: anyone can forge this sender
Findings
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mx redundancy
Only one mail exchanger is published, so there is no failover.
mx.yandex.ru
Fix: Add a secondary MX at a higher priority number.
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spf
SPF has no enforcing terminator, so unauthorised senders are neither marked nor rejected.
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.yandex.ru
Fix: End the record with -all.
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dmarc
DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none), so spoofed mail is still delivered.
v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@auth.returnpath.net,mailto:dmarc-rua@yandex.ru; ruf=mailto:dmarc_afrf@auth.returnpath.net
Fix: Move to p=quarantine and then p=reject once your reports show only legitimate senders failing.
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mta sts
No MTA-STS policy, so inbound mail can be downgraded to an unencrypted connection.
Fix: Publish _mta-sts.yandex.com and host a policy at https://mta-sts.yandex.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
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mx
1 mail exchanger published.
10 mx.yandex.ru
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dkim
DKIM keys found for 1 selector.
mail._domainkey
Records
| MX | 10 mx.yandex.ru |
|---|---|
| SPF | v=spf1 redirect=_spf.yandex.ru |
| DMARC | v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@auth.returnpath.net,mailto:dmarc-rua@yandex.ru; ruf=mailto:dmarc_afrf@auth.returnpath.net |
| DKIM selectors | mail |
| MTA-STS | not published |
| TLS-RPT | not published |
| BIMI | not published |
| DNSSEC | not validating |
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curl "https://mailgrade.dev/v1/domain?domain=yandex.com"
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